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ABSTRACT 
A large scale slope instability developed at an operating mine over two years, resulting in 
a 4.5 million tonne collapse in July 2004. 
 
During this period the Geotechnical personnel monitored and inspected the slope to 
ensure that the safety of personnel and equipment was not compromised.  Monitoring of 
the slopes was done using visual inspections, conventional survey methods and the use of 
the Slope Stability Radar.  The details of the observations and the monitoring results are 
described in this project, as well as the methods used to try to predict the onset of failure.  
The Slope Strain method of predicting failure is evaluated. 
 
An important part of the management of a failure is the control measures that are put in 
place.  The control measures, and how they are escalated in reaction to an increasing risk, 
are discussed. 
 
Certain trigger levels were put in place.  Due to location of mining at time of collapse the 
evacuation of personnel based on the trigger levels was not required.  The effectiveness 
of the different trigger levels is evaluated. 
 
All slope deformation and slope failures behave differently.  When no site specific 
historical data is available, the geotechnical practitioner relies on available literature to 
formulate guidelines and threshold levels for the monitoring, prediction of failure, and 
safe management of unstable slopes.  The detailed case study described in this report is 
considered to be a valuable contribution to the literature in these fields.  The data 
contained in the report have been presented in detail since they may be of value to other 
researchers and practitioners in the rock slope field. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
All natural and man-made slopes can be expected to record deformation, mainly due 
to the effect of time and stress.  Man-made slopes are normally associated with a 
higher exposure of people near the slope, be it a road excavation or an open pit slope.  
The consequences of failure of a man-made slope can therefore be very high due to 
the possible injury to personnel as a result of the failure.  In an open pit environment 
a failure can also have detrimental economic consequences.  It is therefore important 
to be able to monitor the displacement of slopes and give advance warning of 
instability.   
 
The time dependant behaviour of slopes needs to be understood before a slope can be 
monitored effectively.  Various authors have developed models to describe this 
behaviour.  There are also a number of techniques and systems available to monitor 
slope displacement.  These displacement models and monitoring techniques will be 
used to describe the slope displacement recorded in an open pit mine.   
 
The purpose of slope monitoring is to determine when the displacement will result in 
a failure that could pose a risk to men and equipment.  Models that are used to predict 
failures will be described, as well as the methods used in the case study.   
 
In an open pit environment where instability has been identified, this instability has to 
be managed properly to ensure the safety of personnel, while the maximum amount 
of ore is extracted before the slope collapse.  A sound understanding of the behaviour 
of slopes, the failure mechanism causing the instability, adequate monitoring systems 
that produce reliable data and an understanding of failure prediction methods are key 
aspects that will contribute towards a well managed instability.   
 
The purpose of this project is to describe the slope displacement model, monitoring 
techniques used and prediction and management of a large open pit slope instability.  
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In spite of the various displacement models, failure prediction techniques and 
monitoring systems, it is proposed that there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to slope 
monitoring.  Monitoring systems, threshold criteria and operational controls have to 
be reviewed on an ongoing basis, as new information becomes available. 
1.1 Definition Of A Failure 
The term “failure” can be used loosely and needs to be properly defined.  Several 
authors make the distinction between a slope that has “failed” and a slope that has 
“collapsed” (Sullivan 1993; Zavodni 2001, Call 2001, Mercer 2006 and Sullivan 
2007).  Zavodni (2001) explained that the technical definition of a slope failure is 
when the driving stress exceeds the resisting stress and yielding movements develop.  
Call (1982) in Zavodni (2001) made the distinction between a theoretical and an 
operational failure.  Theoretical failure is displacement beyond recoverable strain, if 
the rock is considered to be an elastic material.  Operational failure is defined when 
“the rate of displacement is greater than the rate at which the slide material can be 
mined safely and economically, or the movement produces unacceptable damage to a 
permanent facility”.   
 
Mercer (2006) defined the terms “collapse”, “functional failure” and “instability” as 
follows: 
“Collapse” is defined as the complete overall loss of rock mass integrity and 
structure. 
 
“Functional failure” is defined as the situation where a slope cannot perform the 
function for which it was intended.  This implies that it does not necessarily involve 
overall collapse although localised sections of the structure may have collapsed.  
Examples would include haul roads and ramps. 
 
“Instability” is defined as any other deformational movement or behaviour that does 
not involve collapse and/or functional failure. 
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The author has experienced a creep type “failure” of a low angle slope, where ore was 
mined at the bottom of the slope as the failed material slid down the slope.  This 
could be done safely since the failure mechanism was well understood.  The 
movement was continuously monitored based on a well developed Failure 
Management Plan that identified displacement trigger levels and associated 
responses.  The equipment used and the geometry (available space at the pit bottom) 
were additional factors that were considered.  This led to a distinction, at the specific 
mining operation, between “failure” and “collapse”.  Failure in this case would be 
similar to Call’s (1982) definition of theoretical failure, while collapse would indicate 
operational failure.  In this research this distinction between failure and collapse will 
be used.  The term “instability” would refer to a situation where the time/ deformation 
curves would indicate increasing slope movement, but failure and/or collapse have 
not taken place. 
 
1.2 Time Dependant Slope Movement 
Sullivan (1993) suggested that basic structural geological concepts can be used to 
understand slope behaviour.  He referred to the four time dependant strain effects on 
rocks that Spencer (1988) identified: 
1) elastic and/or plastic creep 
2) transient creep 
3) steady state creep 
4) accelerated strain prior to failure. 
 
Based on these concepts, Sullivan (1993) divided horizontal movement of pit slopes 
into four stages, each with some approximate scales of movement : 
1) elastic movements (mm in shallow or hard rocks; mm to m scale in deep 
and/or soil/soft rock) 
2) creep movements (10s to 100s mm) 
3) cracking and dislocation (0.2m to several m) 
4) collapse (greater than 0.5m) 
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Sullivan (1993) expanded this idea and developed “ground reaction curves”, where 
horizontal movement is plotted against depth (see Figure 1).  Curve 1 represents a 
wedge or planar failure where the failure plane was exposed as the pit is deepened.  
The slope movement described by the author in this case study can be defined by 
curve 2, where a complex failure was triggered as the mine deepened.  The movement 
resulted in a failure (collapse of the slope).  Pure elastic movement is described by 
curve 4.  
 
Figure 1 Ground Reaction Curves (after Sullivan 1993) 
 
The displacement related to each stage depends on the type of rock mass that makes 
up the slope and the slope height.  Elastic and creep movements normally do not 
affect mining operations since the movements are very small and/or the displacement 
rate very low.  Operations are not necessarily affected during the “cracking and 
dislocation” stage, but some impact can be expected during the collapse stage.   
 
Pi
t D
ep
th
Displacement
Cracking & Dislocation
Creep
Elastic
Failure
1
2
3
4
Pi
t D
ep
th
    5 
Martin (1993) developed models to describe the time dependant behaviour of slopes 
based on his investigation of the deformation data and failure mechanisms of 6 case 
studies and a literature review.  He defined three phases of deformation, i.e. (see 
Figure 2): 
• Phase I : Initial response 
• Phase II : Strain hardening 
• Phase III :  Progressive failure 
 
According to Martin (1993) the slope deformation recorded during the initial 
response are adjustments in response to the removal of material from the slope.  
Although failure is not expected during this phase, displacements varying from a few 
centimetres to more than one meter can be recorded.  The movement rates in this 
period decreases from an initial rate of several millimetres per day to almost no 
movement.  Martin (1993) described the decrease in movement rate by means of a 
negative exponential relationship.  He further acknowledged that a number of 
external factors affected the behaviour of slopes by assigning two constants in the 
equation which were a function of the rock mass quality, slope geometry mining rate 
and failure mechanism. 
 
Martin (1993) suggested that a “locking up” of rock mass due to dilation occured 
during the strain hardening phase and that available shear strength on discontinuities 
or within the rock mass was mobilised.  This results in increased stability.  This phase 
can be identified by the short period of increased displacement rates in Figure 2, after 
which the movement decreases.  According to the model the “Initial Response” and 
“Strain Hardening” phases are both part of a regressive behaviour phase of the slope.  
Several phases of strain hardening can be experienced by a slope, normally in 
response to mining.  Martin (1993) described a number of events on the North Wall 
of the Palabora open pit between 1984 and 1989 that resulted in strain hardening. 
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Figure 2  Martin's (1993) model for time dependant deformation behaviour (After Mercer 2006) 
 
Martin (1993) contributed the “Progressive failure period” as a response to ongoing 
deformation experienced by the slope.  The displacement keeps increasing during this 
period, with an associated increase in the movement rates.  Strain softening can occur 
as a result of the decrease of shear strength due to the increased displacement.  
Without external forces the displacement will take place at a constant rate.  These 
external events (e.g. blasting, rainfall) can lead to acceleration and eventually to a 
slope collapse. 
 
Zavodni (2001) identified an “Initial Response” to mining as a result of elastic 
rebound, relaxation and/or dilation of the rock mass.  During this phase no failure or 
defined failure surface is developed.  Total displacement during this phase can vary 
from 150mm (competent rock) to 500mm (highly fractured, altered rock), as reported 
by Martin (1993) in Zavodni (2001), while movement rates between 0.1mm/day to 
4mm/day can be expected.  Total movement and movement rates depend on the rock 
mass quality.  The movement recorded during this initial response should not affect 
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the slope stability.  According to Sullivan (2007) this initial response phase includes 
the elastic movement and part of the creep movement he described in 1993. 
 
The advanced stages of slope movement (cracking and dislocation and failure) 
described by Sullivan (1993) can be related to the “Regressive” and “Progressive” 
phases of time dependant movement of slopes, as proposed by Broadbent and 
Zavodni (1982) and Zavodni (2001), which are defined as follows (Figure 3): 
 
“A regressive failure is one that shows short-term decelerating displacements cycles 
if disturbing events external to the rock are removed from the slope environment.  A 
progressive failure, on the other hand, is one that will displace at an accelerating 
rate, to the point of collapse unless active and effective control measures are taken.” 
 
Figure 3 Rock failure types based on structure / slope characteristics (after Broadbent and 
Zavodni 1982) 
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The original work by Broadbent and Zavodni (1982) was based on observations of 
several well documented failures that were observed.  The stages were related to 
failure geometry, as depicted in Figure 3.  Sullivan (1993) suggested another phase, 
namely a stick-slip type, which is characterised by sudden movements followed by 
periods of little or no movement. This is similar to the cyclical behaviour described 
by Martin (1993).  The movement in the “slip” period is triggered by a specific event, 
for example rainfall or blasting.  Martin (1993) contributed the “stick” period of the 
displacement to possible “strain hardening”.  The displacement curves showing the 
different stages are illustrated in Figure 4.  In the author’s experience is was difficult 
to distinguish between the regressive period of the Type 3 and the Type 4 (stick-slip) 
in Figure 4.   
 
 
Figure 4  Typical time displacement curves (after Broadbent and Zavodni, 1982; and Sullivan, 
1993) 
The cycles of Type 1 regressive movement are experienced when the driving force 
temporarily exceeds the resisting force.  The slope behaves regressively when the 
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movement decelerates before the next trigger event.  These triggers are usually 
external forces such as blasting, rainfall, change in groundwater pressure or mining 
related (removal of buttress).  According to Zavodni (2001) this type of slope 
movement normally becomes more stable as the ratio of driving force and resisting 
force decreases. 
 
When a slope is recording increasing displacement rates, the challenge for the 
practitioner is to decide whether this period of increased rates is one of the cycles in 
the regressive phase, or whether it is the onset of a progressive phase.  An increase in 
the movement rate, i.e. acceleration, is normally an indication of a progressive 
movement phase. 
 
When the dip of the structure is steeper than the effective structure strength, Type 2 
progressive slope movement (refer to Figure 3 and Figure 4) can be expected.  Many 
large failures have started as regressive failures but developed into progressive 
failures, resulting in the Type 3 curve in Figure 4.  Zavodni (2001) suggests that these 
types of failures need extensive monitoring and attention, since Type 1 conditions are 
normally controlled and Type 2 fails soon after exposure.   
 
Sullivan (2007) highlighted some perceived shortcomings in the existing models as 
described above.  The two most important criticisms were the fact that the current 
models did not indicate the large time periods over which acceleration is taking place.  
The other was the fact that the model implied that slopes record large displacements 
over long periods prior to failure.  Because the focus of practitioners is the prediction 
and timing of failures, not enough emphasis is placed on the early stages of 
movement of the slope, i.e. the period prior to cracking and dislocation.  Quite often 
there are more opportunities and scope for remedial measures during this period.  
Based on experience with recent failures, Sullivan (2007) also recommends the 
inclusion of post failure slope behaviour as an additional stage of slope deformation. 
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Sullivan (2007) expanded the models proposed by Broadbent and Zavodni (1982), 
Sullivan (1993) and Zavodni (2001) by dividing pit slope movement models into 
three periods, namely pre-failure movements, failure movements and post failure 
movements.  The advantage of the updated classification system is that it allows for 
more detailed descriptions for the different periods of slope movement.  The modified 
classification system is shown in Figure 5 
 
Figure 5 Modified pit slope failure classification system (after Sullivan, 2007) 
 
Mercer (2006) reported on the outcome of a research project in which a total of 42 
case studies and 83 failure events were reviewed.  He concluded that no two failures 
are similar due to the fact that most failures are structurally controlled.  Mercer went 
on to explain that the time scale involved with structurally controlled failure is 
normally within the life span of a pit slope.  It is thus important to understand the 
time dependant behaviour of such a slope.  The studies indicated that the peak and 
residual strengths of discontinuities are also time related. 
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From the case studies Mercer (2006) concluded that specific events triggered 
increases in deformation rates in slopes.  In a mining environment these triggers are 
normally blasts or rain events.  The author has experience of a number of collapses, 
of varying sizes, that were triggered by such events.  Mercer (2006) referred to the 
rapid increase in the deformation rate following an event, as the initial response.  This 
initial response is followed up by a quick reduction (decay) in movement rates and 
then a long period of slowly reducing steady state creep.  Close to the collapse of the 
slope the behaviour of the decay cycle changes.  The decay period gets longer (see 
Figure 7) and the slope behaviour eventually reaches a point where the deformation 
rate increases exponentially, until the slope finally collapses. 
 
Mercer (2007) utilised the similarities in the rock mass deformation behaviour of the 
various case studies to build a model of deformation behaviour.  He proposed that 
time and event dependant deformation can be grouped into 5 distinct stages of 
deformation.  The following stages are based on deformation behaviour in terms of 
horizontal and vertical displacement and displacement rates: 
• Stage 1 and 2 :  Pre-collapse, primary and secondary rock mass creep:  Mercer 
(2007) found that specific events can result in a sudden increase in 
deformation rate.  In a mining environment these are normally rain or blast 
events.  This peak in movement rate is followed by a period of decay 
(reduction) of the deformation rate until it eventually reduces to a steady state 
creep.  During the initial stages (Stage 1) this recovery period is relatively 
short and steady state creep deformation is reached.  During Stage 2, this 
recovery is slower and steady state creep is not reached.  The deformation 
rates of the successive transient creep periods are also higher during Stage 2.  
Both Stages 1 and 2 are characterised by regressive behaviour. 
• Stage 3 : Post onset of failure (OOF) to collapse.  During this period the slope 
is experiencing continuous acceleration in the magnitude of deformation and 
thus increases in the movement rate, up to the point of collapse.  During this 
stage the slope movement is progressive. 
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• Stage 4: Post-collapse behaviour.  This is the period after collapse has taken 
place and before mining or recovery of the failure commences.  The 
deformation during this period can be complex and Mercer (2007) identified 
six different modes of behaviour during this time.   
• Stage 5 :  Post mining/Recovery behaviour mode.  The non-failed rock mass 
of the slope stabilises and the deformation modes recover.   
 
The models proposed by Mercer (2006) is illustrated in Figure 6 and Figure 7. 
 
Figure 6 Generalised Time and Event Dependent Rock Mass Deformation Model.  An 
Illustrative Deformation Pattern for Horizontal Displacement Behaviour (After Mercer 2006). 
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Figure 7  Generalised Time and Event Dependent Rock Mass Deformation Model.  An 
Illustrative Deformation Pattern for Horizontal Rate Behaviour (After Mercer 2006). 
Although all the proposed models have evolved and become more complex as more 
information became available and the behaviours were better understood, the 
following are common points in all the models: 
• An initial response period during which slope movement is elastic and, with 
no further changes, no failure is expected and movement rates will eventually 
reduce to zero.   
• Slopes can perform progressively (increased movement rates) or regressively, 
or in some, a combination of the two. 
• In a mining environment movement is mostly triggered by external events 
such as blasting or rainfall. 
• No two failures behave the same since the behaviour is a function of the rock 
mass conditions and structures. 
 
1.3 Monitoring Methods 
Many authors have noted that slope failures do not come without warning: 
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“… if a landslide comes as a surprise to the eye-witnesses, it would be more accurate 
to say that the observers failed to detect the phenomena which preceded the slide.” 
Terzaghi (1950).  
“…… slopes seldom fail without giving adequate warning”. (Hoek and Bray, 1974). 
 
A reliable monitoring system needs to be in place to record and identify slope 
deformation.  Although the most obvious purpose of a monitoring system is safety 
related, slope deformation monitoring also enhances the understanding of slope 
behaviour and assists in the improving of designs (Hoek, Rippere et al 2001).  The 
back analysis of slope deformations and mimicking of the results with numerical 
modelling can result in steeper slopes, with its associated economic implications, 
without compromising safety. (Du Plessis and Martin, 1991).   
 
According to Hartman et al (1992) the objectives of pit slope monitoring should be : 
1. For the safety of personnel and protection of equipment; 
2. To provide early warning of an instability to allow plans to be modified to 
mitigate the effect of a failure. 
3. To provide geotechnical information to assist with the understanding of the 
failure mechanism, to design remedial measures and to improve future 
designs.  Stacey (2007) confirms the importance of monitoring in the design 
process. 
 
Monitoring in an open pit should not only concentrate on surface movement, but 
systems should also be installed to monitor sub-surface movement.  The timely 
collection and interpretation of the data, followed by distribution of the results, forms 
the complete slope monitoring system.  There are numerous case studies available 
and various authors that have described monitoring systems for open pits.   
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The details of the monitoring systems described below are a compilation of 
descriptions by Little 2007, Jooste and Cawood (2007), Kayesa (2007), Stewart et al 
(2001), Flores and Karzulovic (2001) and Cahill and Lee (2006). 
1.3.1 Visual inspection 
Visual inspections are the first “line of defense” of the slope monitoring system.  It is 
done by walking and physical inspection of all berms, haulroad and pit perimeters.  
During these inspections any new tension cracks, rock falls, slumping, heaving or 
other indication of instability should be noted.  Photographs are a handy way of 
keeping notes and to monitor the condition of a specific area over time.  
 
Inspections should be part of the routine tasks of the geotechnical section.  The 
frequency of inspection depends on the conditions and risk of the area.  Increased 
incidents of rock falls, a high rainfall event, new cracks or operations close to a high 
wall can be triggers for an increased frequency of inspections.  Operators and pit 
supervisory personnel should receive some basic geotechnical training to increase 
their awareness of geotechnical matters.  These extra eyes can assist in identifying 
possible indications of instability around the pit. 
1.3.2 Crack monitors / surface extensometers. 
One of the most basic forms of equipment is a crack monitor.  This can be in the form 
of two pegs driven into the ground on either side of a crack, a wireline tripod with 
alarm system or an off the shelve crack meter system with alarms.  One of the 
advantages of these basic systems is the ease of which measurements can be taken, 
which means that anybody in the pit can monitor movement.  The more sophisticated 
crack meters can be linked to a telemetry system which can trigger an alarm in a 
control room or in the geotechnical office. 
1.3.3 Survey monitoring 
The conventional survey system consists of monitoring targets that were manually 
surveyed with a total station.  However, this system has been replaced by robotic 
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systems at most mines, where the prisms are surveyed on a regular interval and the 
information transferred to the survey and/or geotechnical office, where the data is 
reviewed and analysed.   
 
Conventional manual surveying takes a lot of time and labour, and is prone to human 
error.  The advantages of an automated system are the continuous surveying, which 
produces more data, and the flexibility to survey high risk areas more frequently.  The 
results are also more readily available than data from conventional surveying.  Many 
of the automated systems also have an alarm system, where trigger levels can be set.  
When movement exceeds the trigger levels it will send out alarms as emails and text 
messages to mobile phones. 
1.3.4 Radar Technology 
The use of radar technology for the monitoring of open pit slopes was implemented in 
2002 (GroundProbe, 2005).  The technology uses differential interferometry to 
measure sub-millimetre movement of a slope.  This is done by comparing the phases 
of the radar signals it receives from one scan to the next.  Any phase difference that is 
recorded is converted to a millimetre measurement.  The system can scan an entire 
face (as opposed to the discrete points of a survey system) and scans 24 hours per 
day, in all weather conditions.  Data is transferred to the geotechnical office as it is 
collected – thus almost real time (Harris et al, 2006).  The radar systems have alarm 
capabilities where an alarm will be activated when trigger levels have been exceeded. 
 
The main disadvantage of the system is that the deformation history is lost when the 
unit is moved.  After a new set-up the deformation starts from zero.  
 
1.4 Prediction of Failures 
Slope monitoring results are in most cases plotted as displacement or velocity against 
time.  This data is investigated and analysed to identify a trend or a change in the 
trend.  Once a change in the displacement trend of an operating slope has been 
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identified, the question that needs to be addressed is whether or not it would lead to 
“operational failure”, and if so, when.  The analysis of data can be done in various 
ways.   
 
The most often used is the time-displacement curve, which works well in the initial 
stages of a developing instability.  One of the classic examples of a failure prediction 
with time-displacement plots was recorded at Chuquicamata in 1969 (Kennedy and 
Niermeyer 1970), where a large slope failure was accurately predicted.  These plots 
will also give an indication of whether the slope is experiencing regressive or 
progressive movement.  A shortcoming of displacement versus time plots is the 
uncertainty of how much of the initial movement has not been recorded, because the 
operational difficulties related to the installation and maintenance of monitoring 
stations near active operational areas often results in the loss of the initial 
displacement record (Zavodni 2001).   
 
The importance of the time-displacement curve is confirmed by Wylie and Munn 
(1978), but they also point out the importance of a correct scale for the axes.  The 
author has also experienced that the selected scale of the plot can further complicates 
the interpretation of deformation plots.  The same data can indicate an imminent 
failure or slow creep, depending of the scale of the plot.  This is discussed in more 
detail in Section 2.6.6.  Wylie and Munn (1978) continued to discuss the relationship 
between the frequency of monitoring and the rate of movement and the escalation of 
monitoring frequency and interpretation techniques as the rate of movement, or risk 
profile to the operations, changes. 
 
When the displacement trend changes it requires some quantification of the amount 
of change.  Movement rate is one of the more popular methods of quantifying 
displacement (Sullivan 1993) and is confirmed by Wylie and Munn (1978).  
Movement rates allow one to compare the displacement in various areas of the mine 
with each other.  It can also be used as a decision making tool in the management of a 
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failed slope.  Certain criteria can be established that will trigger management 
responses.  Flores and Karzulovic (2001), Zavodni (2001) and Naismith and Wessels 
(2005) have described examples of trigger levels and associated management 
responses.  A summary of the movement thresholds as described by some authors are 
given in Table 1.    
 
Author Movement thresholds Actions Description
Martin (1993) 0.1mm/day (0.004 mm/hr) Initial rock mass response
0.2 to 2 mm/day (0.008 to 0.08 mm/hr) Strain hardening
10 - 100 mm/day (or more) (0.4 - 4.1mm/hr) Progressive failure
Flores and Karzulovic (2001) Less than 10mm/day (0.4mm/hr) Conditions normal; no indication of instability
10 - 30mm/day (0.4 to 1.25mm/hr)
More detailed monitoring required
Appearance of cracks
30 - 50mm/day (1.25 - 2.1mm/hr)
Potential for instability (if ongoing for longer 
than 2 weeks)
More than 50mm/day (2.1mm/hr) No mining allowed
Zavodni (2001) 0.1mm/day (0.004 mm/hr) Initial response
Less than 17mm/day (0.71 mm/hr) No failure expected within 24hrs
Less than 15mm/day (0.63 mm/hr) No failure expected within 48hrs
More than 50mm/day (2.1 mm/hr)
Indicates progressive failure (total collapse 
expected within 48 days)
More than 100mm/day (4.2 mm/hr)
Clear mining area (Progressive geometry and 
progressive velocity)
150mm/day (6.25 mm/hr) Clear mining area (Regressive geometry)
Naismith and Wessels (2005) 84 mm/day (3.5mm/hr) Alert : Increase monitoring assessments
120 mm/day (5 mm/hr) Alarm : Inform operations
240 mm/day (10 mm/hr) Scram : Pit evacuation
Roux, Terbrugge and 
Badenhorst (2006)
0.1 mm/day (0.004 mm/hr) for 3 days ; 
downward vertical movement Red alert
0.2mm/day (0.008 mm/hr) Evacuate
0.5 mm/day (0.02 mm/hr) for 10 days; 
horizontal movement Orange alert
1.0 mm/day (0.04mm/hr) for  3 days; 
horizontal movement Red alert
2.0 mm/day (0.08mm/hr) horizontal 
movement Evacuate
Sullivan (2007) 0.1 - 0.25 mm/day (0.004 - 0.01 mm/hr)
Definite movement of slope related to shear of 
displacement on structures
0.25 - 0.5 mm/day (0.01 - 0.02 mm/hr) Likely to fail sometime in future
1 mm/day (0.04 mm/hr) High chance of failure
More than 1.0 mm/day (>0.04 mm/hr) Pre-failure collapse movements
 
Table 1  Displacement rate thresholds and related actions and / or descriptions 
 
This range of thresholds is to be expected.  Each slope has a unique geometry, rock 
mass conditions and structural setting.  Threshold criteria are therefore very site 
specific, even slope specific, but the threshold levels listed in Table 1 can be used 
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(with caution) as guidelines when no site related data is available.  In the author’s 
experience thresholds that are based on back analyses of site – specific incidents will 
provide more reliable results.  
 
Sarunic and Lilly (2006) suggested that the cusums technique can be used to assist to 
identify the inflection point where the slope deformation trend changes.  The cusums 
technique involves plotting of the cumulative sum of the differences between a 
constant value and each data point in the sequence.  Sarunic and Lilly (2006) explain 
the method as follows: 
Let x1, x2, x3… xn be the series of values measured in sequence. 
Select a constant, K. The mean of the data set for which the analysis is being 
undertaken is often chosen as the value of K so that trends can be tracked relative to 
the mean (rather than some arbitrary) value. 
Subtract K from each value in the sequence and then add the differences in a series of 
partial sums; that is: 
S1 = x1 – K; 
S2 = (x1 - K) + (x2 - K) = S1 + (x2 - K); and 
Sn = Sn-1 + (xn - K) = x1 + x2 + x3 + … + xn – nK  
The S values represent a cumulative sum series (or cusum) and S is plotted versus 
position in the sequence. 
 
The use of cusums is used in two case studies where the movement rate is used as the 
constant K value, since the average of total displacement or movement rates was not 
meaningless.  The K value should be developed on site since all slopes and sites 
behave differently.  As a guideline the value should relate to a threshold value at 
which a ‘change of state’ occurs (Sarunic and Lilly 2006).   
 
Various authors (Small and Morgenstern 1991, Brox and Newcomen 2003 and 
Zavodni 2001) suggest high wall strain as an additional decision making tool to 
assess slope stability and predict time of failure.  Certain threshold strain levels are 
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suggested to be indicative of the phase of deformation and can be used to evaluate the 
stability of the slope. 
 
Brox and Newcomen (2003) argued that displacements do not reflect the total strain, 
caused by the displacement, that a slope has experienced.  They define the high wall 
strain criterion as the total slope height divided by the total displacement experienced 
by the slope and expressed as a percentage, and suggest that this criterion can be used 
as an additional method to evaluate slope stability and predict time of failure.  They 
recognised that the amount of strain a slope can accommodate before failure depends 
on the rock mass quality and type of failure mechanism and use the Bieniawski 
(1976) Rock Mass Rating (RMR) system to describe the rock mass quality. 
 
A model was developed from the results of various case studies, and threshold strain 
levels suggested.  This model will be used to test the applicability of the North Wall 
strain values to the levels suggested by Brox and Newcomen (2003). 
 
In this project a failure in a large open pit will be discussed.  The history of how the 
failure developed, the observations during each time period and the associated 
displacement plots will be discussed.  Closer to actual collapse, the monitoring results 
and effect of operations on the monitoring will be explained.  The various monitoring 
techniques, mining controls and actual collapse will be discussed.  The case study 
will be concluded with a review of the effectiveness of threshold trigger levels and 
the various monitoring techniques. 
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2 CASE STUDY 
2.1 Introduction 
On 16 July 2004, at about 07:10 a failure of approximately 1.8 million m3 (about 4.5 
million tonnes) took place on the north wall of an open pit in Zambia. 
 
This failure was the final product of a developing instability that was first identified 
when the benches in these areas were exposed in September 2002.  The mine 
Geotechnical team closely monitored the development of the failure and implemented 
control measures that were improved and adjusted in reaction to observations and 
changing conditions. 
 
The purpose of this report is to describe in detail the monitoring results that were 
obtained both by traditional methods and the Slope Stability Radar System (SSR), 
and to establish critical deformations and deformation rates that can be used to predict 
the onset of collapse in future slopes.  It also describes the actions taken and control 
measures implemented to ensure safe mining below the unstable area. 
 
The progression of the instability from onset to eventual collapse can be analysed in 
four distinct temporal phases. These were:- 
 Prior to July 2003 
 July 2003 to December 2003 
 December 2003 to May 2004 
 May 2004 to July 2004 
2.2 Interpretation of survey results 
When the first increase in movement was observed in July 2003, the total 
displacements versus time graphs were initially used to analyse the data.  At that 
stage the survey intervals were approximately weekly.  The total displacement rather 
than displacement rates curves were used because: 
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a. A graph displaying the movement rate since the previous survey (“since 
previous”) was too erratic to identify a trend. 
b. A graph displaying the movement rate since the implementation of the 
monitoring prism (“since original”) could mask an increase in movement. 
 
By identifying changes in the gradient of the displacement curves, periods with a 
similar rate would be identified and the rate calculated for that specific period and 
expressed as mm/day.  As slope displacements increased, survey intervals were 
reduced and it became necessary to analyse the deformation in terms of velocity and 
acceleration to identify and respond to changes. 
 
It is important to note that all movement rates quoted in this report refer to a rate 
since the previous survey event (instantaneous rate), i.e. displacement over a time 
period divided by the time period. 
 
Figure 8 shows the location of the monitoring prisms in the area under discussion.  
The initial area of instability is defined by the smaller (yellow) shaded zone, while the 
final failure is indicated by the larger (brown) hatched area.  The three vertical 
(green) lines are section lines 22E, 23E and 24E and are 120m apart.  The thicker 
(red) contour lines are bench elevations and have a 15m-height difference. 
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Figure 8 Monitoring prisms installed on North Wall : Red dots - Prior to July 2003; Green dots - 
between July 2003 and February 2004; Blue dots - After February 2004.  Section lines are 
indicated. 
 
As the movement rates increased, the survey monitoring frequency was also 
increased.  When the surveys were done on a daily basis, the daily rates (i.e. “since 
previous”) were used as a parameter to track and compare movement.  With the 
further increase of the frequency to twice per day, the mm/day unit was still used.  
However, with the analysis of the data it would seem as if a mm/hour unit would 
have been a better option in this instance. 
 
With the deployment of the Slope Stability Radar (SSR) the displacement 
information was received approximately every 15 minutes.  Because of this increased 
frequency, mm/hour was used as the measuring parameter.  
165 mB 
135 mB 
225 mB 
Section 22E Section 23E Section 24E 
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2.3 Pre-July 2003 
The first indication of instability around the 23E section line area was observed in 
conjunction with the mining of the 180meter-Bench (mB) in September 2002.  
Sloughing was recorded on the crest of the 165mB and was attributed to localised, 
adverse dipping cleavage planes in the Shale With Grit (SWG) formation that had 
been disturbed as a result of the combination of blasting and relaxation.  Near 
vertical, closely space cleavage planes at an acute angle to the bench face (< 30°) 
were observed on the crest.  At the time of the failure a possible bench scale toppling 
mode of failure was proposed.  This area is shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9  Photo taken on 8 November 2002, showing sloughing on the 165mB. 
 
No further instability was recorded until localised sloughing from the crest of the 
165-180mB was recorded at the end of February 2003.   During February to May 
2003 the failure progressively increased while mining continued.  Sloughing was 
minor and did not interrupt mining operations.  The sloughing was interpreted as 
North Wall – 8 Nov 2002 
Slough  
150mb 
    25 
slope degradation typically found at the mine due to a combination of weathering and 
high seasonal rainfall.  
 
 
Figure 10  Photographs taken on 27 February 2003, showing the failure on the 165mB crest.  
Note the position of MP 4229 in the smaller circle. 
Monitoring of the slough was carried out through visual inspections, crack 
monitoring and survey monitoring.  Monitoring prisms (MPs) were installed on the 
150-165mB benches at the end of 2002.  Results of the survey monitoring during this 
period are shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12.  MP 4229 was installed on the 165mB, 
directly behind the slough and is indicated in Figure 10.  This MP will be referred to 
in the remainder of this report.  
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Isolated incidents of increased movements were observed during this period, e.g. MP 
4229 (dark blue line in Figure 11) around 20 February 2003.  Rates did however 
recover rapidly to below 2mm/day on average.  (Refer to Figure 11.  The graphs are 
also reproduced as Fig A3 and Fig A4 in the appendix to show more detail).  A rate 
of 2mm/day can be considered to be a natural “relaxation” background movement 
typical of the North Wall of the mine. 
2.4 July 2003 – 10 December 2003 
In July 2003 an above average increase in the displacement of some monitoring 
prisms was recorded.   
 
The MPs that recorded the higher rates (MP 4229, 4235, 4284 & 4264) delineated a 
very specific area between section lines 23E to 24E and from the 150mB and to the 
bottom of the pit on the 255mB.  This area was defined as the Area of Concern 
(AOC) on the north wall and was based on (a) displacement rates that were higher 
than those on the rest of the North Wall and (b) increased displacement rates were 
being observed over an area that indicated instability could be occurring on an inter 
stack scale rather than just bench scale.  See Fig A1 for a photo illustrating the 
condition of the slope and position of MPs at 5 August 2003. 
 
The increase in movement rates occurred in conjunction with the exposure of a 
weaker rock unit in the core of the fold on the 270-285mB.  Figure 13 shows the 
simplified topography at that time and its relation to geology. 
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Weaker 
rock unit 
150mB 
210mB 
270mB 
 
Figure 13 A section through the AOC indicating the geology.   
 
Monitoring prism 4229, which was installed in November 2002, had recorded 
295mm of total displacement by the end of June 2003.  In discussions with 
consultants to the mine it was suggested that “failure is unlikely if the total movement 
in the slopes is less than 500mm…” (Terbrugge 2003).  The consultants have been 
involved with the open pit for more than 29 years and have experienced similar types 
of failures on the north wall.  Three months elapsed between the mining of the 
165mB (September 2002) and the installation of the monitoring prism.  At an average 
movement rate of about 12mm/day during this period, the total displacement on the 
135mB could have been 483mm, i.e. very close to the perceived critical 
displacement.  
 
The increase in movement rates was first recorded between 11 and 14 July 2003.  The 
upper lift of the 285mB in the fold zone was exposed at the beginning of July 2003, 
while the bottom lift of this bench was mined on about 18 July immediately below 
the area of concern (Figure 14).  At that time (approximately 17-18 July) another 
increase in rates was recorded. 
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Figure 14 Photo taken on 18 July 2003.  Shovel and trucks are on 285mB. 
There is no obvious causal link between the elevation at which mining was taking 
place and the elevation at which movement was occurring.  At the time it was thought 
that the movement was caused because of displacement on the vertical joint planes of 
the fold, which reduced the confinement of a band of weak talc dolomite, thus 
causing the upper benches to record movement.  
2.4.1 Survey Results 
During July and August 2003 the movement rates of individual prisms (MPs 4229, 
4235, 4264, 4284 & 4331) increased from below 2mm/day to 6-10mm/day.  A graph 
showing the increase in movement is shown in Figure 15.  Graphs indicating the 
displacements and rates for this period are given in Fig A5 and Fig A6.  Other MPs 
on the north wall recorded no increase in movement rates during the same period. 
 
 
Slough at 23E 
Fold in this area 
285 mB 
255 mB 
CDol 
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Figure 15 Displacement - time graphs of some MPs in Area of Concern 
 
From the end of August the movement rates (MPs 4229, 4235, 4264, 4284 & 4331) 
again dropped to below 2mm/day.  Movement rates were constant at this rate until 
December 2003.  The decrease in movement rates coincided with the movement of 
mining activities towards the west of section line 21E and thus further away from the 
AOC.  There is an obvious, but not fully understood, link between mining activity 
below the AOC and displacement.  Mining further to the west appeared to have little 
or no influence on the movement rates. 
 
By the beginning of December 2003 MP 4229 had recorded 584mm of total 
displacement.  The perceived critical displacement defined in August had been 
exceeded.  This was identified as a cause for concern and control measures were 
enhanced and formalised, as discussed in section 2.4.3.  Refer to Fig A5 and Fig A6 
in the appendix for details on the survey results. 
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During this period the prisms displayed cyclical behaviour as proposed by Broadbent 
and Zavodni (1982) and Sullivan (1993) – refer to Figure 16.  While the behaviour of 
MP 4284 almost represent the “Stick-Slip” type of displacement, prisms MPs 4229 
and 4235 behave more according to the Regressive (Type 1) behaviour as shown in 
Figure 4.   
Total Displacement
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
30
-O
ct
-2002
13
-N
o
v
-2002
27
-N
o
v
-2002
11
-D
e
c
-2002
25
-D
e
c
-2002
08
-Ja
n
-2003
22
-Ja
n
-2003
05
-F
eb
-2003
19
-F
eb
-2003
05
-M
a
r
-2003
19
-M
a
r
-2003
02
-Ap
r
-2003
16
-Ap
r
-2003
30
-Ap
r
-2003
14
-M
ay
-2003
28
-M
ay
-2003
11
-Ju
n
-2003
25
-Ju
n
-2003
09
-Jul
-2003
23
-Jul
-2003
06
-A
ug
-2003
20
-A
ug
-2003
03
-S
ep
-2003
17
-S
ep
-2003
01
-O
ct
-2003
15
-O
ct
-2003
29
-O
ct
-2003
12
-N
o
v
-2003
26
-N
o
v
-2003
10
-D
e
c
-2003
Date
Ve
c
to
re
d 
M
o
v
e
m
e
n
t (m
m
) 
4229
4235
4330
4284
4325
4324
4331
 
Figure 16  Displacement time graphs showing the different type of displacements during this 
period 
2.4.2 Observations 
Initially visual inspections of the north wall were conducted about once per month by 
walking and physically examining each bench.  These took place from 90mB to 
225mB but could not extend to lower benches due to lack of access.  No monitoring 
prisms were installed below 240mB.  Following the increase in movement rates in 
July 2003, the frequency of visual inspections was increased to weekly. 
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During the inspections completed in this period very few indications of instability or 
movement were observed.  Although cracks existed on the benches, they were the 
result of sloughing between the 165 and 225mBs during February to May 2003.  
Virtually no indications of more recent deformation were observed during the 
inspections.   
2.4.3 Actions  
Various control measures were put in place at the beginning of August 2003 after the 
initial increased rates were recorded.   
 
Survey and inspection frequencies were increased, additional monitoring prisms 
installed and personnel awareness of the situation increased.  The details of the 
actions are described in an internal memorandum titled “Status Report on North Wall 
Movement”, dated 20 August 2003. 
 
FLAC modelling of the failure was also carried out by ITASCA (Leach 2003).  The 
results of the modelling suggested a factor of safety of less than 1 for the model and 
indicated a potential 50m deep failure between the 120mB – 300mB.  Different 
mining options for the 300 and 315mBs were evaluated.  The modelling concluded 
that neither leaving a buttress nor mining according to original design would reduce 
further the FOS as the critical failure surface emerged at the 300mB above the more 
competent Feldspathic Quartzite (TFQ) horizon.  No adjustments were thus made to 
the design. 
 
At the beginning of December 2003 the level of awareness and operational controls 
for the mining below the AOC were further enhanced and formalised because of the 
following reasons: 
• Onset of rainy season. 
• Increase of movement rate of some monitoring prisms in the AOC. 
• Mining operations resumed below the AOC on the 300mB. 
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• Total displacement recorded at that time had exceeded a perceived critical 
threshold (see section 2.4.1). 
 
The control measures were described in a mine procedure which details the 
geotechnical and operational requirements that need to be in place, as well as control 
measures and reporting systems.  It also describes the frequency of survey monitoring 
and visual inspections.   
2.5 10 December 2003 – 19 May 2004 
2.5.1 Survey Results 
Towards the end of November 2003 the mining activities moved back to the eastern 
side of the mine, east of section line 24E and thus below the AOC.  Mining activities 
were on the 300mB.  As mining activities progressed towards the 22E-23E area, the 
movement rates of the monitoring prisms (MPs 4229, 4235, 4264, 4284 & 4330) in 
the AOC increased.   
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Figure 17  Movement Rates and Blast Events (blue vertical lines indicate blast events) 
 
On 10 December a trim blast was taken on the 300mB (north wall) between sections 
23.5E - 23.75E.  The first peak in movement rates as a result of blasting was recorded 
following this blast.  This is a very important observation as it is the first identified 
link between blasting and accelerated displacement.  After the initial peak, the 
movement rates dropped again, but this time the average rates had increased to about 
5mm/day as opposed to less than 3mm/day prior to the blast.  Details of the 
movement rates and initial influence of blasting are shown in Figure 17. 
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Date of 
Blast 
Description No of 
Holes 
Effect on Survey 
Results 
3 Dec 03 South Wall Trim; East of 24.25E 18 No influence 
5 Dec 03 South Wall Trim; East of 24.5E 16 No influence 
8 Dec 03 North Wall Trim; 24.5 – 25E 16 Slight influence 
9 Dec 03 Trim in AOC (23.25 – 24.5E) 15 Effect not clear 
10 Dec 
03 
Trim in AOC (23. 5 – 23.25E); Small 
slough on lower benches after blast 
18 Peak in movement rates 
after blast. 
16 Dec 
03 
South Wall trim east of AOC 32 No influence.  Rates 
dropping after blast 
19 Dec 
03 
West of 23E (AOC) 17 No influence 
29 Dec 
03 
North Wall Trim in AOC (22.75 – 
23.25E) 
14 Effect not conclusive 
(small jump same day) 
31 Dec 
03 
North Wall Trim and production in 
AOC (23 – 23. 5E) 
27 Increase to around 
15mm/day after blast 
11 Jan 04 North Wall Trim and production in 
AOC (23.25 – 23.75E); Increased 
charges for use of front end loader 
(FEL) for production 
26 Large peak to 30 – 
40mm/day 
27 Jan 04 North Wall Trim and production in 
AOC (23. 5 –24E); Increased charges 
for use of front end loader (FEL) for 
production 
26 Large peak to 30 – 
40mm/day 
Table 2 Blasts: December 2003 to 17 February 2004 (Blasts that influenced movement rates are 
in bold) 
 
The relation between blasting and survey results is evident in Figure 17.  Some of the 
blasts did not affect the survey results since they were not directly below the AOC.  
The details of the blasts in and adjacent to the AO
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Following the increase in movement rates due to blast events in December and 
January, the movement rates typically would “recover” to a rate similar to the pre-
blasting rate.  Towards the end of February and during March, the “recovery rate” 
was much slower and did not reduce to the pre-blast rates.  Towards the end of March 
the movement rates were all below 10mm/day.   
 
Three blasts in April, especially the blast on 14 April, had a significant influence on 
the slope movement.  Instantaneous movement rates of more than 150mm/day were 
recorded – see Figure 18.  The instantaneous rate may in fact have been higher as the 
survey measurement only took place several hours after blasting, by which time the 
rate of displacement was probably reducing. 
 
If Figure 18 is compared with Figure 7 the similarity between the recorded behaviour 
of the slope and the Mercer model (Mercer, 2006) is evident.  The blasts in April 
mark the change from a “Stage 1” type behaviour to a “Stage 3” type behaviour. 
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Figure 18 Movement Rates : 16 February to 20 May 2004 
This movement rate is based on the total displacement recorded between two 
consecutive surveys, one done prior to and the other after the blast, approximately 15 
hours apart.  Although the survey rates did recover to lower rates, the “recovered 
rates” were significantly higher than those prior to the beginning of April 2004.  For 
example, MP 4229 had an average movement rate of less than 10mm/day during most 
of March (excluding periods following a blast).  After the mid-April peak, the 
movement rates of MP 4229 were never lower than 20mm/day.  A graph of the 
movement rates for the period 10 December 2003 to 29 May 2004 can be seen in Fig 
A8. 
 
During this period the total displacements recorded increased dramatically.  MP 4229 
reached 1000mm by early January, while MP 4330 (installed 20 August 2003) 
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reached 1000mm by 4 February.  By mid May MP4229 had reached 3430mm and 
MP 4330 3627mm.  Total displacements for this period are shown in Fig A7. 
 
Towards the end of February 2004 the monitoring prisms on the 150 and 165mB 
recorded higher movement rates, and slower recoveries after a blast, than the other 
monitoring prisms.  The cycle of increased rates after blasting followed by a recovery 
period continued for the remainder of this period.  
2.5.2 Observations 
Until the end of December very little physical manifestation of the recorded 
movements was evident on the slopes.  At the end of December, a crack started to 
develop on the 150mB at the toe of the face.  Movement on this crack was substantial 
and it was already 1m wide by mid February.  More than 2.5m of movement was 
recorded by the crack monitoring measurements by mid April when measurements 
were suspended for safety reasons – see Figure 19. 
 
Cracking was also evident on all the benches between the 150 and 210mBs, between 
section 24E and 23E.  No indication of any movement or instability was observed 
above or either side of the AOC. 
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Figure 19 Crack on the 150mB at 28 January 2004.  Note position of MP 4330 
More incidents of sloughing of material had been observed since the beginning of 
January.  The most noticeable slough was after the blast on 27 January, when a 
reasonable sized boulder was dislodged from the 150mB face and came to rest on the 
crest of the 165mB.  (“Notes on North Wall – 1 March 2004”). 
2.5.3 Actions 
Following the significant increase in movement rates on 28 and 29 January 2004, 
mining operations below the AOC were temporarily suspended to facilitate a 
thorough investigation.  Following the investigation, mining resumed under enhanced 
control measures.  These were added as amendments to the existing mine procedure. 
 
The most significant control measures were: 
• Mining operations were restricted to daylight hours only.  
• Continuous survey monitoring of the Area of Concern.  The surveying was 
done from the south wall.  The surveyor was required to start the daily survey 
1 m 
MP 4330 
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with a conventional, detailed survey.  Thereafter he took distance 
measurements only at regular intervals (starting off at 30 minutes) to the MPs 
in the AOC.  
• A Geotechnical Observer was posted with the surveyor on the south wall.  He 
would assist with the plotting of the survey results and the calculation of the 
movement rates.  Should certain trigger levels be exceeded, he would follow 
certain protocols depending on the recorded rate. 
• Following a rainstorm of sufficient intensity to cause temporary cessation of 
production operations, the go-ahead to resume operations would be given by 
the Senior Geotechnical Engineer (SGE) or the Group Geotechnical Engineer 
following examination of the face and survey monitoring records. 
• Movement rate trigger levels, and related actions should levels be exceeded, 
were listed in detail in a mine procedure. 
 
Mining continued under the enhanced controls stipulated in the updated KCM 
procedure as described above until mid April.  The increased displacements following 
the blast on 16 April (as described in section 2.5.1) necessitated another critical 
evaluation of the trigger levels and controls.  A consultant was on site to review the 
situation.  As a result of the review, the trigger movement rate was revised from 
40mm/day (1.6mm/hour) to 60mm/day (2.5mm/hour), additional monitoring prisms 
were installed and the procedure detailing the controls was amended to ensure 
effective evacuation of the affected area.  (Terbrugge, April 2004). 
2.6 20 May to 16 July 2004 
At the end of April 2004 a proposal was made to implement the Slope Stability Radar 
System (SSR), developed by GroundProbe, in the open pit.  This self contained, 
rapidly deployable system provided a 24-hour cover of the complete face (about 3500 
pixels) and was able to discern average movement across a pixel with sub-millimetre 
accuracy at a range up to 850m.  Deformations were measured at approximately 
15minute intervals and transmitted via radio link to a central site where they were 
updated and displayed graphically.  
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The fact that the existing survey monitoring system only partly covered the area of 
concern was identified as a shortcoming in the safety procedure.  The SSR offered 
significantly enhanced monitoring accuracy and a spread that afforded the mine the 
opportunity to improve safety, improve productivity and to enhance future slope 
designs.  
 
The system was deployed at the mine on 19 May 2004, on the 225mB on section 23E 
on the south wall.  Within the first couple of hours of monitoring it became evident 
that deformation was occurring over a substantial portion of the slope from 150mB to 
315mB and from 21E to 24E, a much larger area than had been detected by survey 
and visual monitoring. 
2.6.1 Radar Survey Results 
The initial radar results for the north wall indicated two distinct areas of relative high 
displacements: the 150/165mB between 23E to 24 E and an area at about 21E, from 
the 270mB to 345mB– these areas are shown as dark red areas in the bottom graphic 
of Figure 20.  The former coincided with the Area of Concern, as described earlier, 
while the second area was an area where rockfalls and sloughing had been recorded, 
but did not lie above an active mining area.   
 
The colour coding in the GroundProbe software uses the convention of warmer 
colours representing greater amounts of movement towards the measuring point.  
Colder colours represent movement away from the measuring point.    The blue 
polygon in Figure 20 (in photo and displacement plot) indicates the area that was 
identified as the AOC, based on the survey monitoring results and visual 
observations, while the red polygon is the area indicated by the SSR as recording 
movement. 
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Figure 20 Initial Radar Survey Results-figure showing information that is relayed from the 
deployed unit to the central site. Warmer colours in the figure’s bottom right indicate greater 
movements. 
 
From these radar results it also became evident that, apart from the two “hot spot” 
areas described above, the area of movement on the north wall was much larger than 
expected.  Although the displacements and movement rates are relatively small, an 
area of increased movement (yellow shaded area in Figure 20) can be distinguished 
from a background area of almost no movement, i.e. white shaded areas in Figure 20.   
 
The radar results did thus confirm the survey monitoring results, both in magnitude 
and location.  However, they did more than that.  They also highlighted a specific 
area of high movement rate (21E) and a large area of the north wall that was 
recording some movement, albeit small.  The 21E area was not identified by the 
survey monitoring due to a lack of monitoring prisms.   
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The yellow area in Figure 20 highlights the enhanced survey capabilities of the SSR.  
Although some individual monitoring prisms were surveyed and did record 
movement, the total area experiencing movement was never as clearly defined as in 
the SSR images.  The SSR also covered an area on the lower slopes where very few 
monitoring prisms were installed. 
Figure 21 SSR results in June and July.  Note the (red) area of high movement on the 150/165mB 
The SSR indicated the highest movement rates of the scan area on the 150/165mB.  
The results from a graph drawn in the window labeled “3” in Figure 21 are shown in 
Figure 22.  As can be seen from the graph, the movement rates in this area were fairly 
constant at about 2mm/hour (48mm/day) during June and the early part of July. 
1 2 3 
4 6 5 
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Figure 22 Radar Results – June 2004.  (Refer to area “3” in Figure 21) 
 
2.6.2 Observations 
The north wall bench inspections were terminated in mid April due to safety 
concerns.   
 
However, visual monitoring of the face from a distance was ongoing.  Although it 
was more difficult to quantify bulk movement, observers were instructed to look for 
signs of local instability such as small sloughs, rolling rocks and dust.  Most of the 
sloughing that was recorded occurred on the lower benches as a direct result of 
nearby mining activities causing disturbance of previously sloughed material. 
2.6.3 Failure at Section line 21E 
On Saturday, 22 May 2004, a collapse occurred at 21E, in the area indicated as being 
unstable by the SSR as described in Section 2.6.1.  Unfortunately observers did not 
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routinely scrutinise the displacements in this area since this was outside the active 
mining area.  The failure was also shortly after implementation of the SSR and 
personnel were still in the process of understanding the results and putting monitoring 
procedures in place.  The huge increase in movement data (4 readings per hour as 
opposed to a maximum of 2 surveys per day) did take a while to get used to.  The 
Geotechnical team was still in the process of developing protocols to handle the 
increase in data and to get familiar with the alarm systems of the SSR when the 
failure took place.  No advance warning of this failure was thus issued.  No injury or 
damage to equipment occurred due to the failure – the outcome was a delay in mining 
the 345mB whilst access was cleared. 
 
A back analysis was carried out on data obtained from an analysis window that was 
located retrospectively to cover the area.  The following observations were made 
from the back analysis (refer to Figure 23): 
 
• The increase in movement rates can clearly be seen in Figure 23. 
• The first time an instantaneous rate of 3.5mm/hour was exceeded was 
approximately 12 hours before the failure. 
• The instantaneous rate exceeding a 5mm/hour trigger level would have 
triggered an alarm 6 hours before failure. 
• An instantaneous trigger rate exceeding 10mm/hour would have meant 2 
hours of warning. 
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21E  Movement Rates
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Figure 23 Back Analysis - 21E Failure figs 1, 2 and 14 refer to different windows placed 
retrospectively on the area 
This information was used to establish the following Management responses to be 
invoked when mining in the area of concern.   
 
Trigger Level Response 
3.5mm/hour Increase frequency of rate calculations to every 30 minutes 
5mm/hour Increase frequency of rate calculations to every 15 minutes 
Inform Control Tower of Alarm status 
Inform Geotechnical Engineer on duty 
10mm/hour Evacuation from area 
Table 3 Trigger levels derived from the 21e Failure 
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2.6.4 Radar Results Prior to Failure 
The movement rate of about 2-3mm/hour continued until about 9 July, when it started 
to increase at a slow but steady rate (Figure 24).  On Sunday 11 July the rates had 
increased to between 5 and 10mm/hr.  On Monday 12 July the rates jumped to about 
20mm/hr following blasting during the afternoon and continued between 20 – 
30mm/hr until early in the morning of Thursday 15 July (about 02:00), when the rates 
accelerated until final slope collapse on Friday, 16 July at about 07:10.   The increase 
in movement rates can clearly be seen in Figure 24.  The average movement rate 
immediately prior to failure was around 100mm/hr.  The radar results of the four days 
prior to failure are presented in Figure 25. 
 
The total displacements are not recorded by the SSR.  Every time the scan is 
interrupted and restarted (for example, when the system is moved or stopped), the 
displacement for the new scan is recorded from zero.  However, the displacement of 
the 150/165mB (area #3 in Figure 21) as recorded by the SSR during the four days 
prior to failure was about 2800mm.  
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Figure 24 Radar Results : 16 June – 16 July.  Blast events are indicated by blue lines.  
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The last displacement of MP 4229 was measured on 14 July.  The total displacement 
recorded since November 2002 was about 8174mm, while MP 4330 recorded 
7221mm of displacement between August 2003 and 7 July 2004.  These two 
monitoring prisms were located at about 23.5E, thus directly above the “old slough” 
(February 2003) area and recorded the highest displacement of all the MPs on the 
slope.  For displacement records of some of the other MPs refer to Table 4 and to 
Figure 8 for their locations on the North Wall. 
 
MP Date of  
1st Survey 
Bench Section Tot Displ Date of 
last 
reading 
4323 20/8/03 135 22.75 453 14/7/04 
4324 20/8/03 135 23.25 467 7/7/04 
4330 20/8/03 150 23.5 7221 7/7/04 
4325 20/8/03 135 23.75 511 14/7/04 
4328 20/8/03 150 22.25 319 7/7/04 
4329 20/8/03 150 22.75 808 7/7/04 
4331 20/8/03 150 24 2963 14/7/04 
4223 14/11/02 165 22.5 1293 14/7/04 
4229 26/11/02 165 23.25 8174 14/7/04 
4235 5/12/2002 180 23.5 2934 14/7/04 
4310 22/5/03 225 21.75 1762 8/7/04 
4311 22/5/03 225 22.5 2064 8/7/04 
4312 3/12/03 225 22.75 379 17/2/04 
Table 4  Total displacements by MPs at time of failure. (MPs are listed by bench) 
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Figure 25 Movement Rates and Displacement in the four days prior to Failure 
2.6.5 Evaluation of Trigger Levels. 
During the time of the failure no mining was taking place directly below the Area of 
Concern.  Although monitoring of the failure was ongoing, it was not necessary to act 
on exceedances of the trigger levels.  However, the SSR records of the period shortly 
before and during the failure were used to evaluate the trigger levels determined 
earlier, as discussed in Section 2.6.3. 
 
The information from four wall files (different scan periods) for the 150/165mB was 
grouped and is plotted in Fig A11.  (The displacement values of the last three files 
were adjusted to provide a continuous record; otherwise the data for each file would 
have started at null displacement.)   
 
The first time the 3.5mm/hour trigger was exceeded was on 16 June.  However, due 
to the fluctuations in the movement rates it was agreed that at least 3 consecutive 
Blast on Monday 12/7/04 
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exceedances were required to trigger the alarm.  This would have been on 1 July.  
From 9 July the movement rates were continuously above 3.5mm/hour (see Fig A11).  
The evacuation alarm of 10mm/hour was first exceeded on 5 July.  On 12 July a blast 
resulted in a movement rate above 10mm/hour, and the rate never recovered from 
this.  The details of the exceedances of trigger levels are detailed in Table 5. 
 
 1st Trigger 3 Consec. Triggers Continuous 
 Date Days Hrs Date Days Hrs Date Days Hrs 
3.5 mm/hr 16 June 
19:28 
29.5 708 1 July 
17:40 
14.6 349 9 July 
08:20 
6.9 167 
5 mm/hr 19 June 
11:07 
26.8 260 9 July 
16:30 
6.6 158 11 July 
17:40 
4.6 109 
10 mm/hr 5 July 
11:00 
10.8 260 12 July 
16:15 
3.6 87 12 July 
16:15 
3.6 87 
10mm/hr 
(Adjusted) 
5 July 
11:00 
10.8 260 14 July 
03:31 
3.3 79 14 July 
18:42 
2.7 66 
Table 5 Table showing dates when trigger levels would have been exceeded.  The warning of a 
failure this would have given is listed in days and hours. 
 
From the above table it is clear that, if the trigger levels were to be applied to the 
movement rates on the 150/165mB prior to failure, adequate evacuation warning 
would have been given. 
 
The blast on Monday, 12 July resulted in a jump in the movement rates (Figure 25) to 
above 10mm/hour.  To further test the trigger levels, it was decided to eliminate the 
effect of the blast to see if the evacuation trigger would have been triggered early 
enough.  Figure 26 shows the results when this jump is eliminated and it is assumed 
that the movement rates would have followed the same movement rates for the 
remainder of the period.  The three consecutive readings exceeding the 10mm/hr 
trigger would have given 3.3days (79 hours) warning of collapse – refer to Table 5. 
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Figure 26 SSR Movement Rates and Adjusted movement rates for the period following the blast 
on Monday, 12th July.  The various trigger levels are also indicated. 
 
From the back analysis of the failure of 16 July and the 21E failure on 22 May 
(section 2.6.3) it would seem as if a 10mm/hr can be used as a warning of an 
imminent failure and thus be used as a final trigger level to initiate evacuation.  
However, it is important to note that this trigger level is based on limited information 
and should be used as a guideline and not in isolation.  It is suggested that three 
consecutive triggers of 3.5mm/hr and 5mm/hr be used to increase frequency of rate 
calculations.  The trends of movement rates should be closely monitored.  Evacuation 
prior to a 10mm/hr trigger might be warranted if a rapid change in the movement rate 
(thus acceleration) is observed.   
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2.6.6 Prediction of time of failure. 
When the initial increase in movement was observed in July 2003, time-displacement 
plots were used in the decision making process.  The change in behaviour was first 
identified in such a plot. 
 
One of the classical examples of a failure prediction with time-displacement plots 
was recorded at Chuquicamata in 1969 (Kennedy, 1970).  The use of these types of 
plots to predict failure in this case study proved to be a problem.  The displacements 
of a number of prisms are shown in Figure 27 and Figure 28.  A dramatic increase in 
the displacement (e.g. MP 4330) can be seen in Figure 27.  Based on this graph it 
would seem as if, by the end of January 2004, failure is imminent.  However, Figure 
28 is a plot of the same prisms showing displacements to the middle of July.  This 
illustrates the effect of scale on a time-displacement curve: the “imminent failure” 
that was suggested in the early December curve can hardly be identified in the July 
curve. 
 
Figure 27 Time-displacement plot of prisms.  Note dramatic increase in displacement during 
December 2003 
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Figure 28  Time - displacement graph of the same prisms at a different scale. 
The time-displacement graph is a handy tool, but should not be used in isolation.  
Once an increase in movement has been established, movement rate and increase in 
movement rate is a more accurate prediction and decision tool.   
 
The effectiveness of the trigger levels was discussed in Section 2.6.5.  Although the 
evacuation trigger level of 10mm/hour was exceeded on 12 July, personnel were not 
evacuated.  Apart from the fact that operations were west of the Area of Concern, it 
was also acknowledged that the movement rates were not increasing.  The evacuation 
of personnel was done early on 16 July.  From the rapid change in movement rates it 
was evident that failure was imminent and personnel were evacuated as a precaution.  
Failure took place approximately 90 minutes after evacuation. 
 
2.7 Failure Mechanism 
Initial instability: 
The initial bench instability that was reported between September 2002 and February 
2003 developed slowly during this period and was attributed to bench scale instability 
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and an adverse dipping structure (refer to the yellow polygon labeled “23E Slough” in 
Figure 34).   The increased movement that was identified by survey monitoring in 
July 2003 was mostly in the area directly above the “23 Slough” and was limited to a 
120m wide area between section lines 23E and 24E and involved only two benches.  
The failure mechanism was toppling on a bench scale, as can be seen from the photos 
in Figure 10.  Although the instability was triggered by a high rainfall season, the 
effect of the steeply dipping structure into the face cannot be ignored. 
 
The period leading up to the failure 
The re-activation of the failure in 2004 was related to the exposure of a fold structure 
and response to mining below the fold.  The failure was complex and most likely a 
combination of two failure mechanisms, i.e. toppling and rock mass failure at the toe.  
The area between sections 23E and 24E continued to topple; an extension of the 
instability discussed above.  Most of the recorded movement was on the 150 and 
165mBs, and the cracks continued to open up – refer to Figure 19.  Initially, only 
limited evidence of movement and/or instability was recorded on the lower benches.  
Evidence for the weakening of the rock mass is the fact that the onset of increased 
movement coincided with mining through a structure and exposing weaker material.  
During this stage (mid 2004) there was no evidence of instability further to the west. 
 
The evidence for the toppling failure is the following: 
• Visual inspections of the “23E Slough” showed evidence of toppling – refer to the 
photo on the right in Figure 10. 
• Large displacements were recorded by prisms in this area. 
 
It was only with the implementation of the SSR that movement to the west became 
evident, a few months prior to the failure.  The full extent of the unstable area became 
clear after the initial scans.  This is confirmed by the displacement records of prisms 
4223 and 4329 that are tabulated in Table 7 and the displacement graphs in Fig A7.  
Both these prisms only recorded about 1000mm of movement by June 2004, while 
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the prisms east of 23E recorded between 2400 and 4700mm of movement (MPs 4235 
and 4330).  No physical evidence of toppling was evident in this part of the slope and 
it seems as if this was mainly a structurally controlled planar failure. 
 
The failure 
Figure 29 was taken during the failure.  The failed area to the west (left hand) in the 
photo is more intact than the area to the right, although the large crack at the top of 
the failure confirms that failure has taken place  Just before the material failed a loud 
“bang” was reported.  After the failure a large, almost vertical, plane was exposed.   
Figure 29 Photo of the failure.  Note the more "disturbed" mass on the right, while the berms on 
the left are still relatively intact. 
 
This would suggest that the eastern (right hand side in Figure 29) toppled and the 
accumulation of toppled material higher up the slope and the associated movement 
resulted in an increased interramp slope angle.  This localised steepening increased 
the stress on the weaker material at the toe of the steepened section to a point where 
the rock mass in the toe failed.  The loud bang could be when the release plane at the 
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back of the failure was formed and the slope to the west (left hand side of photo) 
failed. 
 
The differential displacements on cross sections of the pit slope are depicted in the 
following figures.  Time – Displacement graphs of different elevations were 
constructed from radar information.  Data from the last week prior to failure was 
used.  
 
From Figure 30 it is clear that the upper section of the failed area experienced the 
most displacement.  Most of the slope recorded less than 1.5m of total displacement 
during the week, while the upper bench recorded almost 3.5m of movement during 
the same time.  This evidence supports the overall toppling effect of the failure on the 
eastern section of the failure. 
 
The displacement curves in Figure 31, i.e. a section further west, are however 
different:  Curves 10 and 11 experience very little to no displacement.  (Curve 10 is 
almost on the x-axis and difficult to see).  Although this is expected since the curves 
fall outside of the failure, it is further evidence that the failure was structurally 
controlled: almost no displacement on the benches above the failure, i.e. behind the 
structure that formed the release plane at the back of the failure.  The most 
displacement was recorded by Curves 12 and 13, which were at the crest of the 
failure.  This is similar to what was observed in the section to the east (Figure 30).  
However, the zones on the wall described by Curves 15, 16 and 17 recorded more 
displacement than Curve 5 zone, i.e. the middle of the slope, a few days prior to 
failure.  This suggests three zones of different movement: the crest of the failure (that 
recorded the most movement) due to toppling, the mid section, which recorded the 
least amount of displacement in the days leading up to the failure, and the toe section 
of the slope.  If Curve 17 is examined closely it is interesting to note the jump in the 
displacement in the red oval.  This jump occurred on 13 July, at about 21:00.  This 
larger displacement lower down the section would suggest the weakening of the toe 
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prior to failure, and supports the idea of rock mass failure lower down the slope in 
this part of the failure.  
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Figure 30  Time - Displacement graphs from radar results or the ‘East section’.  The different 
curves indicate the displacement at different elevations on the slope.  Refer to Figure 32 for the 
location of the curve on the slope. 
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Figure 31 Time Displacements graph of the Western section, with a zoomed in section at the 
bottom. Note the jump in the displacement of Curve 17 in the red oval.  Refer to the text for an 
explanation of the graphs. 
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Figure 32 This figure indicates the locations of the areas for which displacement curves were 
constructed.  The number relates to the curves in Figure 30and Figure 31.   
The failure developed over a long period and the mechanism is complex.  It would 
seem as if toppling, especially during the early stages, resulted in large movement at 
the crest of the failure (up to 7m – see Table 4).  This movement caused a localised 
‘steepening’ of the slope that led to a failure of the toe due to the loading by the mass 
of toppled material.  Large structures within the wall acted as release planes at the 
time of the failure.  
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3 HIGHWALL STRAIN CRITERIA 
The various methods available to predict the onset of failure and time of collapse 
were discussed in Section 1.3.  The most frequently used method involves the use of 
displacement data and the plotting of displacement or velocity against time.  That was 
also used in this case study, where the monitoring evolved from displacement /time 
graphs, to velocity/time graphs to changes to the velocity/time graphs (acceleration).  
Another method suggested by a few authors is to utilise the ratio of total displacement 
and slope height as an indication of an imminent failure.  This method will now be 
evaluated against the information and experience gained with the north wall failure. 
3.1 Background 
Brox and Newcomen (2003) argued that displacements do not reflect the total strain, 
caused by the displacement, which a slope has experienced.  They define the high 
wall strain criterion as the total slope height divided by the total displacement 
experienced by the slope and expressed as a percentage, and suggest that this criterion 
can be used as an additional method to evaluate slope stability and predict time of 
failure.  They recognised that the amount of strain a slope can accommodate before 
failure depends on the rock mass quality and type of failure mechanism.  Brox and 
Newcomen (2003) use the Bieniawski (1976) Rock Mass Rating (RMR) system to 
describe the rock mass quality. 
 
In a planar or wedge type failure mechanism, failure can be expected at very low 
strain levels and the rock mass quality does not play an important role, although the 
orientation and strength of discontinuities play an important role in the failure.  In a 
stepped-path failure the rock mass between the discontinuities has to fail before 
instability takes place, therefore a higher strain rate level than in the case of wedge 
and planar failure can be expected.  When a toppling failure or rotational failure 
occurs large strain levels can be recorded before slope failure takes place, and the 
rock mass quality, especially at the toe of the slope, is important.   
    61 
 
Brox and Newcomen (2003) developed a model from various case studies (Figure 
33), and the suggested strain threshold levels are tabulated in Table 6.  Figure 33 will 
be used to test the applicability of the North Wall strain values to the levels suggested 
by Brox and Newcomen (2003). 
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Figure 33 Strain model developed from case studies by Brox and Newcomen 
 
Highwall Stability Stage Threshold Strain Level % 
Tension Cracks ~ 0.1 
Progressive Movement ~ 0.6 
Imminent Failure/Collapse >2.0 
Table 6  Strain levels suggested by Brox and Newcomen (2003) 
 
Zavodni (2001) suggests that once 0.5% strain has been exceeded, displacement rates 
start to accelerate.  Once slope strain exceeds 1 – 2% the displacement results in 
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collapse.  Small and Morgenstern (1991) found that at a strain of between 0.6 to 1%, 
a failure becomes progressive. 
3.2 North wall conditions for model 
The failure took place in a rock mass with a RMR (Bieniawksi 1976) ranging 
between 35-45, with a strongly developed set of cleavage planes that dip into the 
slope.  Near the toe of the failure is a weak rock mass (RMR below 35 and UCS 
lower than 10 MPa) that has historically been involved in a number of instabilities on 
the north wall.   
 
The survey deformation history of monitoring prisms, circled in red in Figure 34 and 
tabulated in Table 7, was used in the strain calculations.  Monitoring prisms 4223, 
4229 and 4235 were installed relatively shortly after the bench, on which they were 
positioned, was mined out.  Monitoring prisms 4328, 4329, 4330 and 4331 were 
installed in August 2003, thus almost a year after the bench was mined out.  These 
prisms were installed to increase the density of survey coverage after an increase in 
movement rates was recorded.  The other monitoring prisms in the area were installed 
at a much later stage when significant deformation had already taken place and were 
thus not used in the calculations. 
 
Slope
4223 4224 4229 4235 4328 4329 4330 4331 Bench Elev. Height
Dec-02 54 59 105 97 54 54 105 59 195 1138 45
Jan-03 71 112 164 151 71 71 164 112 195 1138 45
Feb-03 93 129 215 186 93 93 215 129 210 1123 60
Mar-03 113 140 281 207 113 113 281 140 210 1123 60
Jun-03 180 171 379 306 180 180 379 171 255 1078 105
Sep-03 262 224 557 495 205 219 445 210 300 1033 150
Dec-03 390 267 736 692 322 336 613 334 300 1033 150
Jan-04 455 292 1124 974 354 395 1067 538 315 1018 165
Feb-04 503 312 1471 1209 377 451 1500 992 315 1018 165
Mar-04 529 343 1936 1427 397 490 2111 1392 315 1018 165
Apr-04 657 350 2338 1629 407 516 2552 1686 315 1018 165
May-04 922 378 3438 2162 457 782 4006 2214 330 1003 180
Jun-04 1046 419 3958 2367 484 872 4696 2414 330 1003 180
Jul-04 1331 440 8275 3020 499 988 7600 3134 330 1003 180
DISPLACEMENT Pit Bottom
 
Table 7 Details of displacement, pit depth and slope height used in strain calculations. 
 
In an effort to calculate the total displacement experienced by the different benches, 
the surveyed displacements were adjusted to cover the period between mining of the 
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bench and installation of the monitoring prisms.  The details of the adjustments are 
listed in Table 8. 
 
 Basis for adjustment Adjustment (mm) 
MP4223 Movement rate of first two month (0.52mm/day) 38 
MP4229 Movement rate of first two month (1.17mm/day) 101 
MP4235 Movement rate of first two month (1.13mm/day) 86 
MP4328 Based on MP 4223 180 
MP4329 Based on MP 4223 180 
MP4330 Based on MP 4229 379 
MP4331 Based on MP 4224 171 
Table 8  Basis for adjustments to cover period between bench exposure and first survey of 
monitoring prisms 
 
Monitoring prisms 4223, 4229 and 4235 were adjusted based on their respective 
movement rates for the first two months after installation.  Because of the long period 
between mining of the bench and installation, monitoring prisms 4328, 4329, 4330 
and 4331 were adjusted based on the displacement of monitoring prisms close to 
them.  The adjustment (in millimeters) was added to the survey displacement for each 
monitoring point.   
 
The displacements recorded by the monitoring prisms at given periods are tabulated 
in Table 7.  Note that this is not the full survey history but summarised data.  In order 
to calculate slope height, the bottom of the pit at the given period is also listed.  The 
slope height was calculated from the crest of the failure (150mB) to pit bottom for 
each given period.  The actual crest of the slope was at the 90mB elevation, but it was 
argued that the slope above the failure was not actively involved in the failure. 
 
    64 
 
Figure 34 The monitoring prisms that were included in the strain analyses are circled in red.   
 
The different stages as suggested by Brox and Newcomen will now be discussed in 
detail. 
3.3 Crack forming 
The first time cracks were observed in the area of the failure was in September 2002 
on the 165mB (near MP 4229) when the 180mB was mined.  However, these cracks 
were related to localised bench scale instabilities due to adverse dipping structures 
and not treated as part of the major failure. 
 
4223 4224 4229 4235 4328 4329 4330 4331
Dec-02 0.12 0.13 0.23 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.23 0.13
Jan-03 0.16 0.25 0.36 0.34 0.16 0.16 0.36 0.25
Feb-03 0.16 0.22 0.36 0.31 0.16 0.16 0.36 0.22
Mar-03 0.19 0.23 0.47 0.35 0.19 0.19 0.47 0.23
Jun-03 0.17 0.16 0.36 0.29 0.17 0.17 0.36 0.16
Sep-03 0.17 0.15 0.37 0.33 0.14 0.15 0.30 0.14
Dec-03 0.26 0.18 0.49 0.46 0.21 0.22 0.41 0.22
Jan-04 0.28 0.18 0.68 0.59 0.21 0.24 0.65 0.33
Feb-04 0.30 0.19 0.89 0.73 0.23 0.27 0.91 0.60
Mar-04 0.32 0.21 1.17 0.86 0.24 0.30 1.28 0.84
Apr-04 0.40 0.21 1.42 0.99 0.25 0.31 1.55 1.02
May-04 0.51 0.21 1.91 1.20 0.25 0.43 2.23 1.23
Jun-04 0.58 0.23 2.20 1.32 0.27 0.48 2.61 1.34
Jul-04 0.74 0.24 4.60 1.68 0.28 0.55 4.22 1.74
STRAIN LEVELS 0F MONITORING POINTS (%)
 
165 mB 
135 mB 
225 mB  
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Table 9 Percentage Strain for Different Periods.  
 
After the initial increase in movement rates in July 2003, some of the existing cracks 
did show some renewed movement.  These cracks were limited to an approximately 
100m wide area east of section line 23E, and include the following MPs: 4229, 4330 
and 4235.  This was the area where a toppling failure mechanism was thought to be 
the overriding mechanism – refer to Section 2.7.  A major crack developed in 
December 2003 – as discussed in Section 2.5.2.  The period June to December 2003 
will be considered as the time when cracks associated with the failure developed.  
The strain levels recorded during this period are plotted in Figure 35.  The June strain 
levels will be related to the toppling part of the failure, while the December levels 
should reflect the condition in the area where a planar failure was the failure 
mechanism.  Refer to Table 9 for the details of the calculated strain.   
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Figure 35 Crack forming strain levels in the North Wall 
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The strain levels in June in the toppling part of the failure (23E – 24E) vary between 
0.3 and 0.4% strain.  In the planar failure section of the slope (west of 23E), 0.2% 
strain was recorded during this period.   
 
The complete range of strain levels associated with cracks forming varies from 0.2 to 
0.5%, as indicated in Figure 35. 
3.4 Progressive Movement 
Zavodni (2001) suggests that ‘progressive failure …. is one that will displace at an 
accelerating rate … to the point of collapse unless active and effective control 
measures are taken’.  It was not easy to establish the onset of progressive movement 
of the north wall.   
 
One criterion that can be used is the response to blasting, as discussed in section 2.5.1 
– refer to Figure 36.  Each peak in the graph represents a survey following a blast.  
The first recorded effect of blasting on movement rates occurred in December 2003, 
when the rates recorded a sharp increase but recovered within a short period (between 
survey intervals) to pre-blasting conditions. This pattern continued until about April 
2004, when the recovery rates were much slower and did not reduce to the pre-blast 
rate.   
 
This is especially evident in prisms 4229 and 4330 and representative of the area 
between section line 23E and 24E, the area that was considered as the toppling failure 
area. The strain levels of these two prisms in April are 1.4 and 1.5% respectively.  
The associated increase in total displacement is reflected in the time-displacement 
graph in Fig A7. 
    67 
Rates
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
10
-D
e
c
-2003
24
-D
e
c
-2003
07
-Ja
n
-2004
21
-Ja
n
-2004
04
-F
eb
-2004
18
-F
eb
-2004
03
-M
a
r
-2004
17
-M
a
r
-2004
31
-M
a
r
-2004
14
-Ap
r
-2004
28
-Ap
r
-2004
12
-M
ay
-2004
26
-M
ay
-2004
Date
Ra
te
 
(m
m
/d
a
y) 
4229
4235
4330
4284
4325
4324
4331
 
Figure 36 Effects of blasting on movement rates.  The peaks represent the movement rates 
following a blast. 
With the introduction of the Slope Stability Radar (SSR) in May 2004 the survey 
resources were utilised in other areas of the pit, and less survey data is available for 
the period after May 2004.  The SSR data was thus analysed to identify the onset of 
progressive movement in the planar failure zone.  Analyses of the SSR data indicate a 
relatively constant movement rate – see Figure 37.  A slight increase in the movement 
rate can be identified in early July and could be interpreted as the onset of progressive 
movement.  A more pronounced jump in the movement rate was triggered by a blast 
on 12 July.  However, it can be argued that this blast only accelerated the failure and 
the “point of no return”, i.e. onset of progressive movement, had already been 
reached at this stage.  The end of June will thus be treated as the onset of progressive 
movement for the planar section of the failure. 
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Figure 37 SSR data for the period 16 June to 16 July 2004.  The smooth blue line indicates total 
displacement while the uneven purple line indicates movement rate in mm/hour 
The calculated strain for the period April to June 2004 is plotted in Figure 38.  Note 
the following: 
• Prisms 4224 and 4328 recorded less than 0.3% strain.  Both these prisms, 
especially 4224, are located away from the failure and, although they recorded 
some displacement due to the failure, should be considered as prisms in semi – 
stable ground. 
• Prisms 4223 and 4329 recorded strain levels varying between 0.3 and 0.6% during 
this period.  Both the prisms were located west of section line 23E, where planar 
failure was the overriding mechanism, and the onset of progressive movement in 
this area has been identified as late June early July 2004 based on the analyses of 
SSR results.  The strain levels recorded by these prisms in June were 0.6 and 0.5% 
respectively. 
• The strain levels recorded by prisms located between section lines 23E and 24E, 
for the period April to June 2004, varies between 1 and 2.6%.  However, by 
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analysing the survey data and the response to blasting, it would appear as if the 
onset of progressive movement was in April 2004.  The lower strain levels, i.e. 1.0 
– 1.5%, in prisms 4330, 4229 and 4331 should thus be considered as the 
applicable strain levels. 
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Figure 38 Strain rates at onset of progressive movement 
In summary it would thus appear as if strain levels of between 0.5 and 0.6% (planar 
failure) and 1 to 1.5% (toppling failure) could be indicative of the onset of 
progressive movement.   
3.5 Failure 
The failure occurred on 16 July 2004.  The last survey of the monitoring prisms was 
taken within the week prior to failure.  The displacements are listed in Table 7.  It is 
interesting to note that some monitoring prisms recorded up to 8m of total 
displacement, including the adjustments described earlier.   
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The failure mechanism described in Section 2.7 is a combination of toppling and 
planar failure.  The strain levels recorded by the survey prisms in July (two days prior 
to failure) are shown in Figure 39 and in tabulated in Table 9.   
Strain Levels at Failure
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Figure 39 Strain rates at failure 
According to Brox and Newcomen (2003) a toppling failure can result in relatively 
high strain value before collapse, while a plane/wedge failure has a much lower 
value.  This would explain the wide range of strain levels at failure.  Monitoring 
prisms 4229, 4235 and 4330 were located in an area where toppling was experienced.  
The strain levels for these prisms vary from 1.7 to 4.6%. 
 
Monitoring prisms MP 4329 and MP 4223 were located further west where the planar 
failure was the main failure mechanism.  The strain levels experienced by these two 
prisms are 0.5% and 1.7% respectively.   
3.6 Results of Strain comparison 
The High Wall Strain Level Criteria proposed by various authors were evaluated 
against survey results from monitoring of the north wall.  The results are summarised 
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in Table 10.  A distinction is made in the north wall results between the prisms that 
were located in an area that experienced a toppling failure mechanism and the prisms 
in a planar type failure. 
 
Cracks formed in the north wall at strain levels that are higher than those proposed by 
Brox and Newcomen (2003), but in line with Zavodni’s (2001) proposal.  It was more 
difficult to identify the period when progressive movement commenced.  However, it 
would seem as if the strain levels in the north wall during this stage of failure 
development were less than both the models. 
 
 
North Wall 
Brox and 
Newcomen 
(2003) 
Zavodni (2001) 
Highwall Stability 
Stage 
Threshold Strain 
Level, %  
Threshold 
Strain Level, 
%) 
Highwall Stability 
Stage 
Threshold 
Strain Level, 
% 
Tension Cracks Planar : 0.2 
Toppling: 0.3–0.4 
~ 0.1 Regressive 
movement 
< 0.5 
Progressive 
Movement 
Planar: 0.5-0.6 
Toppling: 1-1.5 
~ 0.6 Increase in 
movement rates 
> 0.5 
Imminent 
Failure/Collapse 
Planar: 0.5 - 0.7 
Toppling : >1.7  
>2.0 Slope acceleration 
(results in collapse) 
1.0 - 2.0 
Table 10  Suggested Strain Levels for the north wall, compared to those of other authors 
 
During the failure phase the north wall strain associated with the planar failure is very 
similar to that during the progressive phase.  The strain levels are also much lower 
that those suggested by Brox and Newcomen (2003) and Zavodni (2001).  In the case 
of the toppling failure strain levels, the north wall levels are much lower than 
suggested by both models.  The strain levels recorded by the north wall prisms for the 
two different modes of failure are summarised in Figure 40. 
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Strain Levels for Different Stages
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Figure 40  North wall strain levels for different stages 
From Figure 40 the following is evident: 
• All strain levels are within the transition zone of the Brox and Newcomen (2003) 
model. 
• Cracks appeared at the same strain levels for both failure modes. 
• There is a small difference between the strain levels at onset of progressive 
movement and failure, for both failure modes. 
• Failure strain levels in both cases are lower than the strain levels proposed by the 
model. 
 
Based on the above it is not recommended that the strain model be used for the 
prediction of failures.  If more data can be collated and the model populated it might 
be possible to differentiate between the different stages.  At this stage the strain levels 
are all within a relatively narrow zone.  The visual inspection and monitoring results 
did provide more useful information and provided a better decision making tool than 
the strain models.  
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4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The development of the north wall failure at the mine site was closely monitored 
from August 2003 until eventual collapse in July 2004.  During this time mining was 
active below the developing failure.  Although other mining areas were available for 
ore extraction, the majority of the ore from the open pits was mined from this part of 
the part pit.  Loss of ore would have had a detrimental effect on production.  By close 
monitoring of the failure and adapting to changing conditions, all the ore was safely 
mined from below the “Area of Concern”. 
 
The monitoring systems were changed and improved with time.  Survey monitoring 
started off with the weekly survey of prisms that were installed on a standard pattern.  
The frequency progressed through a daily survey to four distance readings per hour.  
Prism coverage was improved when additional prisms were installed based on visual 
inspections and survey results.  The traditional survey methods were replaced with a 
state-of-the-art radar system, which provided almost real time slope surveys.  The 
technology played an important role in the management of the failure and enabled the 
mine to recover all the ore from below the area of concern, in a safe environment. 
 
Analyses of the survey results also evolved.  Initially the results were analysed using 
time-displacement graphs.  When displacement increased, instantaneous rates were 
found to be more effective.  Trigger levels were determined from the back analyses of 
of a smaller failure provided.  During the week prior to failure when the evacuation 
trigger level had been exceeded, the change in the movement rate was used to 
monitor the failure.  Although some attempts were made to predict the time of the 
failure, this was not pursued due to the high risk involved with personnel working 
below the failure. 
 
    74 
Managerial and operating controls were put in place and changed to mitigate the 
increasing levels of risk.  An important part of the management strategy was to keep 
the workforce fully informed.  A few years prior to this event a catastrophic failure 
killed a number of people in the same pit.  The workforce was very nervous that this 
could happen again.  Their confidence in the management of the situation was 
improved with the visual evidence of the thorough management of the situation, in 
addition to the regular feedback sessions.  The visual evidence included increased 
visual inspections involving senior members of the Geotechnical team and improved 
monitoring systems.  The Slope Stability Radar (SSR) played an important part in the 
latter. 
 
Slope Strain was not used during the monitoring of the failure, but was subsequently 
evaluated as a failure prediction tool.  It was found that the strain levels associated 
with the different stages of a developing failure were too close to each other and not 
distinctive enough to provide a practical predictive tool.   
 
All of the above assisted in the decision making process to ensure the safe mining 
below a marginally stable slope.  The movement trigger levels that were determined 
during the failure appear to be applicable to the slope conditions.  They should 
however not be used blindly, but always in conjunction with visual inspections and 
careful analyses of the trend of movement rates  
 
This case study has shown how trigger levels and monitoring systems can be 
escalated in response to increased slope instability.  It is a good example of how 
systems and procedures could be adapted in response to the dynamic environment of 
a developing failure.  This report is a valuable contribution to the literature dealing 
with the monitoring and management of slope instability, since the detailed 
information presented in the report may be of use to other researchers and 
practitioners in this field. 
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Fig A1  Area of Concern as at 5 August 2003.  Note position of Monitoring prisms (those in red 
recorded increased movement rates) 
Fig A2  AOC on 29 April 2004. 
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Fig A9  Total Displacement of monitoring prisms as at 7 July 2004 
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Fig A10  Movement Rates between May 2004 -7July 2004.  Note that few surveys were done due to 
the deployment of  the radar 
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